Distressed sales in OTC markets by Selcuk, Cemil
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/87460/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Selcuk, Cemil 2017. Distressed sales in OTC markets. The Manchester School 85 (3) , pp. 357-393.
10.1111/manc.12153 file 
Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/manc.12153 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/manc.12153>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
Distressed Sales in OTC Markets
Cemil Selcuk
Cardi¤ Business School, Cardi¤ University
Colum Drive, Cardi¤, UK
selcukc@cardi¤.ac.uk
Abstract: We present a stylized model of the over-the-counter markets in the tradition of
Du¢e, Gârleanu, and Pedersen [14] with two distinctive features: (i) buyers have heteroge-
nous preferences and their willingness to pay is private information and (ii) sellers become
nancially distressed if they cannot sell for too long. A unique steady-state equilibrium ex-
ists and it is characterized by predatory buying. Specically, during periods where sellers are
more likely to become distressed (e.g. during economic crises, nancial turmoils etc.) buyers
become more selective and hold o¤ purchasing despite the abundance of distressed sales and
low prices. This reluctance triggers the number of distressed sellers to grow even further and
forces them for additional price cuts.
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1 Introduction
Over-the-counter (OTC) markets, unlike exchanges, operate via search and matching. An investor
who wants to sell or buy an asset must rst search for a counterparty. Transactions are typically
bilateral and private, and prices are determined strategically taking into account the outside option
of each participant. In a seminal paper Du¢e et al. [14] construct a search model of the OTC
markets addressing these frictions.
Even though the model in [14] is based on search, it still portrays a rather standardized and
transparent trading environment. In their model products are homogenous, investors are homoge-
nous, and as the setup is based on complete information, every meeting automatically results in
trade. OTC, however, is a blanket term covering a vast array of products with signicantly dif-
ferent characteristics. Some products are indeed standardized and transparent and therefore t
to the portrayal above e.g. centrally cleared products such as interest rate derivatives traded on
the inter-dealer clearing house SwapClear or equities traded over DCTCC. However, there exists a
1
range of other products that are not nearly as standardized and transparent, and therefore require
a di¤erent modelling approach, e.g. mortgage-backed securities, emerging-market debt, equity
derivatives, exotic derivatives including non-vanilla interest and currency derivatives. These prod-
ucts are highly di¤erentiated and non-standard and they are traded by a diverse investor base with
wide-ranging needs and objectives.
Consider, for instance, the over-the-counter equity derivatives (OTCED). With a total notional
amount exceeding $7 trillion, the OTCED market serves a wide variety of investors including large
corporations, banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, public sector funds, sovereign wealth funds
and so on. The exibility in terms of product design and its private outlook helped the OTCED
market ourish over the years. The market o¤ers a signicant number of products that are not
available on exchanges or clearing houses with strict rules, where products are too standard to
accommodate the particular requirements of an ever-expanding and diverse investor base.
Furthermore OTCED transactions are executed through bilateral meetings and, due to the
private nature of these transactions, the market is characterized by a lack of pre-trade transparency.
A recent report by the Financial Services Authority & HM Treasury states: OTC derivative
markets are not subject to formal pre and post trade transparency requirements. As a result some
market participants have better access to better information.1 Indeed, characterizations such
as "opaque", "murky" or "anonymous" appear frequently in the nancial press describing such
products. The opaqueness of the OTCED market implies that for most products only a limited
amount of pre-trade public data is available, and therefore, investors can nd out detailed product
features only after getting in contact with sellers.
The discussion thus far gives credit to construct a model where investors with heterogenous
preferences operate in a non-transparent market that o¤ers a wide range of heterogenous products.
To capture the notion of preference and product heterogeneity, we assume that the dividend of
an asset consists of two components: a market-wide deterministic and aggregate component x,
plus an idiosyncratic component v, which is a random draw from a known cdf.2 The realization
of v determines how good a t the asset is for a buyers tastes and preferences. Furthermore, to
capture the idea that the market is opaque and characterized by a lack of pre-trade transparency,
we assume that the buyer realizes the quality of the t v only after linking up with the seller. The
realization of v is the buyers private information and it cannot be observed by anyone else.
With these assumptions the probability of trade is endogenous; so, meetings are no longer
guaranteed to result in trade. The search process, from buyers perspective, amounts to nding a
good t and in doing so, they follow a threshold rule: if the quality of t in a match is su¢ciently
high then the deal goes through, otherwise buyers walk away.
1"Reforming OTC Derivative Markets: A UK perspective." Available at www.fsa.gov.uk
2This is a standard technique to accommodate product heterogeneity in the market and preference heterogeneity
among buyers; see for instance Jovanovic [20] or Wolinsky [36].
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There are two types of frictions in the model: the rst is meeting a counterparty and the second
is whether or not the transaction materializes. The literature, spurred by Du¢e et al. [14] captures
the former friction, but not the second. Those models are based on complete information, and
therefore all meetings, by default, result in trade.3 In reality, however, it is not uncommon at all
for parties to walk away without trading; disagreement, in fact, is the more likely outcome. In
addition, with the advancing communication technology, getting in contact with potential traders
is easier than ever; hence the key friction is the latterthat is, whether the buyer wants to purchase
or not. This, in turn, depends on whether the asset is indeed what the buyer is looking for.
The endogeneity of the probability of trade implies that buyers can control, and in fact manip-
ulate, the duration of sale, which brings us to the second component of the model; namely the fact
that sellers can become nancially distressed if they cannot sell for too long.4 Sellers in nancial
markets can become distressed for a variety of reasons including nearing margin calls, pressing
debt obligations, hedging motives, being caught in a short squeeze and so on. To incorporate
this notion, we assume that there is an adverse shock that pushes regular sellers into a state of
permanent distress. It is sensible to think that such a shock is more likely to arrive during episodes
of economic crises, recessions and nancial turmoils. We show that during such periods customers
become more selective and hold o¤ purchasing despite the abundance of distressed sales and lower
prices. By doing so they strategically slow down the speed of trade causing the percentage of
distressed sellers to grow further. This, in turn, exerts more pressure on sellers forcing them for
further price cuts. At the end, distressed sellers not only are forced to cut their already low prices,
but also they nd it more di¢cult to sell and exit thanks to buyers reluctance to trade. This
cycle, which we label as predatory buying, dries up liquidity and increases the cost of liquidation
sales for distressed sellers. Indeed, from their point of view liquidity disappears when it is mostly
needed.
Though it lacks an agreed upon denition in the literature, predation is a prevalent feature of
nancial markets. A recent body of theoretical work explores various mechanisms through which
predatory trading takes place e.g. Attari et al. [3], Brunnermeier and Pedersen [6], Carlin et al.
[9]. In Section 4.2 we discuss these papers in more detail; but at this point we want to point
out that the aforementioned papers are not based on search and matching. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the rst paper exploring predation in a search model of the OTC markets and
3See Du¢e et al. [14], Lagos and Rocheteau [24], Rocheteau and Weill [30], Vayanos and Wang [34] among
others.
4Albrecht et al. [2] and Selcuk [33] provide models on the housing market that have related notions of distressed
sellers. The model in [2] produces various equilibrium matching patterns including opportunistic matching where
regular searchers wait to meet with desperate searchers only. The setup in [33] is open loop in that trading agents
leave the market and are replaced by clones, whereas ours, similar to the aforementioned papers in the OTC
literature, has a closed loop setting where sellers become buyers, buyers become owners and owners become sellers
again.
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bridging the gap between the two strands of literature.
2 Model
We consider a continuous-time economy with a xed supply a > 0 of indivisible assets that yield a
ow of dividends q. Investors are risk neutral and divided into four categories; buyers, non-trading
owners, regular sellers and distressed sellers. Similar to Du¢e et al. [14] we have a closed loop
setting where no agent leaves the market and there is no entry from outside. The total measure
of agents  is xed and exceeds a: Each buyer wants to purchase one unit of the asset to consume
its dividends. After trading, buyers become owners and remain so until they are hit by a liquidity
shock that turns them into regular sellers. The shock arrives with a Poisson rate  and reduces
the ow value of dividends from q to zero, which is why sellers wish to trade and liquidate their
holdings.5 Once the asset has been sold, the seller comes back to the market as a buyer (see the
owchart).
If regular sellers cannot trade for too long then they may become distressed. We model this
notion by another idiosyncratic adverse shock, which, too, arrives at an exogenous Poisson rate :
The shock is similar in nature to the liquidity shock above and may be associated with factors such
as pressing debt obligations, margin calls from other positions and so on. Such di¢culties are more
likely to arise during nancial crises or recessions, so it is sensible to think that  rises during such
periods. Buyers and regular sellers discount future utility at rate e  whereas distressed sellers are
more impatient with  > : A larger value of  implies a more severe shock.
As discussed in the Introduction, investors possess heterogenous preferences. To implement
this idea we assume that the dividend q of an asset consists of an aggregate component x plus an
idiosyncratic component v, that is
q = x+ v:
The aggregate component x is same across all assets, whereas the idiosyncratic component v 2 [0; 1]
is a random draw from the unit interval via the cdf F: Buyers di¤er in terms of their tastes and
preferences, so the realization of v determines how good a t the asset is for a buyers preference.
A high value of v indicates a good t and a low value indicates a poor t. We assume that v is
independent across buyers, so the same asset may be liked by one buyer and disliked by another.
From a buyers perspective the search process amounts to nding a high enough v: The value of
v does not change over time; once an asset is purchased the buyer enjoys the same v forever. We
impose the following assumption on F:
5The liquidity shock in the literature is typically associated with hedging needs arising from a position in another
market; see, for instance, [14], [24] or [34].
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Assumption 1. The survival function  = 1  F is log-concave, i.e.
f 2 (v) + f 0 (v)  (v) > 0; 8v:
The market is opaque and characterized by a lack of pre-trade transparency; hence we assume
that the buyer realizes the value of v only after linking up with the seller and that this realization
is private information. The seller cannot observe v (he only knows the cdf F that generates it), so
he is unable to tailor the price individually, and therefore, he must quote the same price p for each
customer. The probability of trade j is endogenous and depends on the sellers type, regular or
distressed, denoted by j = r; d.
The market operates via search and matching and agents meet each according to a Poisson
process. Specically, a buyer meets a distressed seller at rate md where  > 0 denotes the search
intensity and md denotes the steady state measure of distressed sellers. Similarly, the buyer meets
a regular seller at rate mr, where mr is the measure of regular sellers. Finally, a seller meets a
buyer at rate mb; where mb is the measure of buyers.
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Before proceeding to the analysis, a remark is in order to explain why the trading mechanism
in our setup is price-posting and not bargaining. Indeed, existing papers in the literature consider
Nash or Rubinstein bargaining procedures and it would be interesting to explore the implications
of our model under these pricing mechanisms. However, modelling bargaining with private infor-
mation is a non-trivial task as multiple or a continuum of equilibria are common in such models
(see [21] for an extensive discussion.) With price posting however, equilibrium is unique and can be
characterized analytically. In this paper our goal is to understand how the presence of distressed
sellers a¤ects prices, liquidity and buyers search behavior and to that end the uniqueness of the
equilibrium and the fact that equilibrium objects (prices, probabilities, measures of agents etc.)
can be characterized analytically is indispensable. A second point in defense of using price posting
is the result by Samuelson [31], who shows that in bargaining between informed and uninformed
agents, where parties may bargain by any procedure they deem appropriate, the optimal mecha-
nism is for the uninformed agent to make a take-it-or-leave o¤er. This result indicates that the
optimal pricing mechanism in our model is indeed price posting where the seller (the uninformed
party) advertises a take-it-or-leave-it price.
2.1 Discussion on Modelling Assumptions
The model operates via search-and-matching, and more signicantly it exhibits product and pref-
erence heterogeneity. So, for the model to be relevant, the market in question ought to exhibit
these traits, that is:-
6Du¢e and Sun [16] present a formal proof of this argument. See also Vayanos and Wang [34].
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 Investors should be somewhat in the dark about potential trading opportunities and it should
take time to nd and meet a suitable partner for a trade.
 Second, and more importantly, products ought to be heterogeneous and non-standard, mak-
ing it di¢cult for an investor to assess whether or not a product is indeed suitable for his
specic needs before meeting the seller and scrutinizing the underlying structure of the prod-
uct.
Examples for such markets include markets for mortgage-backed securities, equity derivatives,
collateralized debt obligations and other structured credit products, which are indeed heteroge-
neous and non-standard and usually exhibit complex contractual features. Investors often nd out
the specic details only after linking up with the seller and analysing the underlying structure of
the asset. In [18]s terminology, products in these markets are indeed inspection goods: buyers can-
not resolve the pre-trade uncertainty pertaining the good before inspecting it (i.e. examining its
contractual aspects). Furthermore, a wide variety of investors operate in these marketsinsurance
companies, hedge funds, public sector funds, sovereign wealth fundsall of which have vastly dif-
ferent priorities, constraints and requirements; thus an asset that is a good t for a particular
investor may well turn out to be improper t for another.7
An OTC trade negotiation for such products is typically initiated when an investor nds and
contacts a seller and asks for terms of trade. This process refers to the search and matching friction
above and it is addressed in the paper by the random matching process. Communication could be
by phone, by email, by electronic query systems or, in some markets, through a broker, though we
ignore the role of brokers in this paper. At this step the investor obtains the necessary information
pertaining the product, and after analysing its underlying structure and the terms of trade o¤ered
by the seller, he decides whether to carry on with the transaction or to walk away. This step refers
to the second point mentioned above and this is where the parameter v comes into play.
We assume that the dividend of a product consists of two components: a market-wide aggregate
component x, plus an idiosyncratic component v, which is a random draw from a known cumulative
density function. The value of vis uncertain until the buyer meets the seller and the realization of
v can be interpreted as the inspection process mentioned above. Upon realizing the value of v the
buyer understands how good a t the asset is for his tastes and preferences. This is a standard
7Admittedly, there are other OTC markets, where products are rather standard, transactions are transparent,
the volume of trade is high and the overall trading experience does not t the description above, e.g. recently issued
US government bonds and certain liquid OTC derivatives such as simple interest rate and currency swaps. These
products are indeed natural candidates for exchange-based trade but they are somehow traded over the counter.
From an academic point of view there is a lack convincing theories explaining why such simple products are traded
over the counter and not on exchanges. In this regard, OTC markets where search and matching plays almost no
role and where there is little scope for opaqueness and price and product uncertainty are beyond the consideration
of this paper.
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technique to accommodate the notion of product and preference heterogeneity in that no two assets
are identical and an asset that turns out to be a good t for one buyer may turn out to be a poor t
for another. An advantage of the technique above is the fact the by xing the boundaries and the
density function of v and varying x one can explore how equilibrium objectsprices, probabilities
of traderespond to the degree of product standardization in the market (see the discussion in
Section 4).
3 Analysis
3.1 Steady State Measures
The asset is in xed supply a, so the measures of agents in possession of the asset (owners +
regular sellers + distressed sellers) add up to a; that is
mo +mr +md = a: (1)
The total measure of agents  is also xed and exceeds a: It follows that the steady state measure
of buyers, too, is xed and equals to
mb =    a > 0:
Without loss in generality x mb = 1 so that  equals to 1 + a: Remaining measures mo; mr and
md are endogenous and are determined by the fact that in steady state the inow into a group
of investors equals to the outow from it. Similar to Du¢e et al. [14], we have a closed loop
setup in the sense that no agent leaves the market and there is no inow from outside (see Fig
1 below).Consider distressed sellers. The inow mr consists of regular sellers hit by the adverse
shock. The outow mdd comprises of sellers who trade and become buyers. Setting inow equal
to outow yields
mdd = mr: (2)
Now consider regular sellers. The inow mo consists of owners hit by the liquidity shock. The
outow has two components: mrr which are regular sellers who trade and become buyers plus
mr which are regular sellers who become distressed. Therefore
mo = mrr + mr: (3)
Proposition 1 Equations (1), (2) and (3) pin down the steady state measures mo; md and mr as
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Figure 1: Flowchart
follows:
md = af


df1 +


rg+


d + 1g
 1;
mo = md 


df1 +


rg;
mr = md 


d:
(4)
The measures depend on exogenous parameters ; a;  and  as well as the probabilities of
trade r and d which are endogenous and controlled by buyers.
8 The fraction of distressed sellers
in the market is given by
 
md
md +mr
=
1
1 + 

d
: (5)
Note that  increases as d falls: Indeed if buyers squeeze d then distressed sellers cannot trade
fast enough and their prolonged presence in the market causes  to grow. The growing , in turn,
8The following table summarizes the signs of the partial derivatives of the measures with respect to the parameters
of interest (the algebra is skipped):
  d r
md + + - -
mr + - + -
mo - + + +
A rise in the arrival rate of the liquidity shock  turns more owners into sellers, so md and mr rise while mo falls:
Similarly a rise in the arrival rate of the adverse shock  causes more relaxed sellers to become distressed; hence
mr falls while md goes up. The e¤ect of  on the measure of owners mo is more subtle. The rising  increases
the fraction of distressed sellers, and distressed sellers trade faster than regular sellers; so, at the end, more buyers
become owners, hence mo goes up. Using similar arguments, and the owchart, one can explain the signs wrt j :
8
intensies competition among distressed sellers and forces them for further price cuts. This is the
basic mechanism behind the predation result.
3.2 Value Functions of Owners, Buyers and Sellers
Letting   denote the value function of an owner, we have
  = v + x+ fr    g:
An owner keeps enjoying the idiosyncratic dividend v plus the aggregate dividend x until he is hit
by the liquidity shock , which turns him into a regular seller, whose value function is denoted by
r. Rearranging yields
  =
v + x+ r
 + 
: (6)
Now turn to buyers. Letting 
 denote their value function we have

 = mrIr + mdId;
where
Ij =
Z 1
0
max f  (v)  pj   
; 0g dF (v) for j = r; d:
The expression Ij is the expected surplus to a buyer contingent on having met a type j seller: As
long as the surplus   (v)   pj exceeds the opportunity cost 
 the buyer purchases, otherwise he
walks away. For any given price pj we conjecture an associated threshold (or reservation value)
vj leaving the buyer indi¤erent between buying and searching i.e. satisfying
pj + 
 =   (vj) :
After substituting for  ; the indi¤erence condition becomes
pj + 
 =
vj + x+ r
 + 
: (7)
Buyers decision is simple: purchase if v  vj and keep searching otherwise. Clearly the probability
of trade j is endogenous and equals to
j = Pr (v  vj) =  (vj) ;
where  = 1   F is the survival function. As mentioned earlier, not all meetings result in trade;
for trade to occur the asset has to be a good match for the buyer. Substitute   from (6) into the
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expression for Ij and use the indi¤erence condition (7) to obtain
Ij =
Z 1
vj
v   vj
 + 
dF (v) =
Z 1
vj
 (v) dv
 + 
:
The second step follows from integration by parts. Substituting Ij we get a cleaner expression for
buyers value function:

 = mr
Z 1
vr
 (v) dv
 ( + )
+ md
Z 1
vd
 (v) dv
 ( + )
: (8)
Finally we turn to sellers. Desperate and regular sellers value functions are given by
d = Xd and r = Xr +  (d   r) ; (9)
where
Xj =  (vj) (pj + 
  j) :
Expression Xj is the expected net trade surplus to a type j seller. A seller encounters a buyer at
rate  and the buyer purchases with probability  (vj). If trade occurs the seller obtains price pj
plus 
 (he becomes a buyer now) minus j (he is no longer a seller): With this information it is
easy to interpret d and r: Note that a regular seller keeps track of the possibility of becoming
distressed as well, whereas a distressed seller will remain distressed until he sells.
Note that
( + ) r = Xr +


Xd:
A type j seller solves
max
pj2R+
j s.t. vj = ( + ) (pj + 
)  x  r
taking 
 as given.9 The function j is a weighted average of Xjs; so, the optimal price pj must,
by the Bellman principle, maximize the net surplus Xj. The FOC, thus, is given by
pj + 
  j =
(vj)
( + ) f (vj)
: (10)
Expression (10) is the net trade surplus for a seller and the fact that it is positive implies that,
conditional on having met a buyer and that the buyer is willing to transact, the seller is willing
to transact as well (instead of walking away). To see why, note that if the seller transacts then he
9Sellers are atomless and they fail to realize the e¤ect of an individual price change on buyers value of search;
see [8] for a discussion.
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obtains price pj plus the value of becoming a buyer 
, whereas if he waits then he continues to
obtain j: Since pj + 
 > j; the former option outweighs the latter.
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It is easy to verify the second order condition; thus the solution above corresponds a maxi-
mum.11 Inserting the FOC into Xj yields
Xj =
2 (vj)
( + ) f (vj)
:
Substituting this into (9) produces the closed form expressions for sellers value functions:
d (vr; vd) =
2 (vd)
 ( + ) f (vd)
and (11)
r (vr; vd) =
2 (vr)
( + ) ( + ) f (vr)
+
2 (vd)
 ( + ) ( + ) f (vd)
: (12)
Now we can dene the equilibrium.
Denition 2 A steady-state symmetric equilibrium is characterized by value functions  ; 
; d;
r given by (6), (8), (9) and the pair v
 = (vr ; v

d) 2 [0; 1]
2 and p = (pr; p

d) 2 R
2
+ satisfying
indi¤erence (7) and prot maximization (10). The steady state measures md;m

r and m

o; also
implicitly part of the equilibrium, can be recovered from (4).
10Recall that our setup is a closed loop setting with no entry or exit. Provided that the outside option associated
with exiting the market is normalized to zero, the no-exit condition is non-binding. Indeed the fact that both r and
d, given by (11) and (12), are positive implies that along the equilibrium path, all sellers, regular or distressed,
would prefer to remain in the market even if they were allowed to exit. In the literature, the outside option is
interpreted as the rate of return of a risk-free asset and it is typically normalized to zero e.g. Brunnermeier and
Pedersen [6]. From a broader perspective, theoretical models studying OTC markets, including this one, are partial
equilibrium settings: the focus is the OTC market and other alternatives that investors might turn to (e.g. the
"risk-free" market) are treated exogenously. To meaningfully discuss exit and entry decisions one needs a general
equilibrium setup where the rate of return in the alternative market, too, is endogenous and investors are free to
self select themselves into whichever market they want. This, however, is beyond the scope of the current paper.
11We have
X
00
j =   ( + ) ff
0 (vj) ( + ) fpj +
 jg+ 2f (vj)g :
Substitute the FOC (and omit the argument vj) to obtain
X
00
j =   ( + )

f 0+ 2f2
	
=f:
The expression is negative because of log concavity (Assumption 1).
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4 Results
4.1 Existence of Equilibrium and Liquidation Sales
Combine indi¤erence conditions in (7) with FOCs in (10) to obtain the following system of equa-
tions that pin down the equilibrium values of vr and v

d :
r (vr; vd) =  (vr) =f (vr) + r   x  vr = 0 and (13)
d (vr; vd) =  (vd) =f (vd) + ( + ) d   r   x  vd = 0: (14)
Proposition 3 The equilibrium exists and it is unique. In equilibrium distressed sellers pursue
liquidation sales as they accept to trade at lower prices and consequently sell faster, i.e. pd < p

r
and d > 

r:
In the proof we show that the locus of r = 0 is downward sloping wrt vr whereas the locus of
d = 0 is upward sloping; so, they intersect once in the vr vd space, which implies that there exists
a unique v satisfying (13) and (14) (the proof is in the appendix). Furthermore, the equilibrium
is characterized by liquidation sales. After being hit by the adverse shock, a distressed seller grows
impatient and quotes a lower price in an e¤ort to quickly exit from his position. (In section 4.3 we
provide numerical simulations exploring the cost of such sales.) The price-cut produces the desired
outcome: the inequality d > 

r implies that distressed trades materialize faster than regular
trades.
Before moving on, we briey comment on the link between the aggregate yield x and the
probability of trade. As seen above, from a buyers point of view the search process amounts to
nding a high enough v since all assets yield the same deterministic x. So, it may appear that the
aggregate yield x plays no role in determining the probability of trade; however this is not true.
As it turns out, buyers pay little or no attention to v if x is large enough.
Remark 4 Both r and 

d rise in the deterministic component x of a product. Specically
r < 

d < 1 if 0 < x < x
+
r < 

d = 1 if x
+  x < x++
r = 

d = 1 if x
++  x;
where x+ and x++ are thresholds given by (29) and (34).
If x shrinks, then the idiosyncratic goodness of t v becomes too important for buyers, and
therefore no meeting is guaranteed to result in trade. Indeed if x < x+, then even distressed sellers,
who charge lower prices, face some uncertainty about whether or not they can sell. However, if x
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starts to grow, then buyers start paying less attention to v, and therefore d and 

r start to grow
as well. For an illustration see Fig 2a.
0 1.46 2.7 3
0
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regular sales
distressed
sales
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0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
µ
Percentage of Distressed Sales
True value
(with predation)
without
predation
2b
0.05 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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Distressed Price
True value
(with predation)
without predation
2c
With some abuse in labelling, one can re-interpret this simulation by thinking of x as a proxy of
product standardization in the market. To see why, note that E[v] and StDev [v] are xed in the
simulation whereas x ranges from 0 to 3. If a product has a high value of x, then the random t v
is relatively unimportant in that the product possesses little chance of not being compatible with
buyers preferences; hence it can be labelled as "fairly standard" (e.g. vanilla products traded via
clearing houses). The opposite is true if x is small (e.g. exotic products traded through bilateral
meetings). With this interpretation, panel 2a suggests that the probability of trade (and therefore
the speed of trade) increases with product standardization: the more uniform the products the
faster the trade. In addition, the probability of trade can be 1 if products are "standard enough"
i.e. one does not need perfectly uniform products as in Du¢e et al. [14] to ensure that all meetings
result in trade.
4.2 Predation
Proposition 5 If the adverse shock arrives more often, i.e. if  rises, then the equilibrium price
pd falls, yet the probability of trade 

d decreases, i.e. buyers deliberately delay purchasing from
distressed sellers despite the falling prices.
13
It is sensible to think that the adverse shock  is more likely to arrive during periods of
turmoils and economic crises. The proposition says that during such times distressed sellers lower
their prices, yet buyers become more reluctant to purchase. This behavior (labelled as predation)
further increases the percentage of distressed sellers in the market and forces them for further price
cuts.
The mechanism behind the result is this. An increase in  causes sellers and buyers value
functions to move in opposite directions making sellers worse o¤ and buyers better o¤. Specically,
the fraction of distressed sellers  rises with  and intensies the competition for distressed sellers.
Realizing that many other sellers are in the same dire situation, distressed sellers are forced to cut
their already low prices. The question is whether price cuts generate the desired outcome and the
answer is no; indeed their probability of trade d falls instead of rising. To understand why note
that distressed sales come with greater consumer surplus, which means that the rising  boosts
buyers value of search. Realizing that there are plenty of good deals in the market, buyers hold o¤
purchasing and search longer, i.e. they lower d: This response has the following feedback e¤ect.
By lowering d buyers strategically slow down the speed of trade and cause  to grow further. The
growing , in turn, puts additional downward pressure on prices and so on. For an illustration of
these arguments see Figure 2b and 2c. The solid lines in panels 2b and 2c are the true values of
 and pd, whereas the dashed lines are what they would have been had the probabilities of trade
remained intact. The di¤erence between the two lines, therefore, is due to predation mechanism
described above.12
Predation is a prevalent feature of nancial markets, especially during nancial crises where
the adverse shock  is indeed more likely to arrive. A recent body of theoretical work explores
mechanisms through which di¤erent forms of predation may take place. For instance in Attari et
al. [3] predators lend to nancially fragile players in an e¤ort to obtain higher prots by trading
against them for a prolonged time. Carlin et al. [9] construct an equilibrium where cooperation
among traders occasionally breaks down leading to predatory trading and episodic illiquidity. In
Brunnermeier and Pedersen [6], which is arguably the most inuential paper in this literature, if
a distressed trader is forced to liquidate, other strategic traders initially sell in the same direction
driving down the price even faster and then buy back at the low price.
The aforementioned models are not based on search and matching. They take either the aggre-
gate demand function or market price equations parametrically without deriving them explicitly
from the mechanics and frictions of a decentralized market (as in the literature spurred by Du¢e
et al [14]). To our knowledge this is the rst paper studying predation in a search model of the
OTC markets and bridging the gap between these two strands of literature.
12The dashed lines are obtained by xing d = 0:89 and 

r = 0:59 which are the equilibrium values when
 = 0:05: This is why in both pictures the solid and dashed lines intersect at  = 0:05:
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In addition, the papers above are all based on settings with heterogenous investors in terms of
their size and their ability to take multiple positions and these assumptions are vital in producing
predatory mechanisms in those settings. For instance, in Brunnermeier and Pedersen [6] it is the
presence of large strategic traders and their ability to impact market prices single-handedly that
triggers prices to fall to articially low levels. Without such large players the predation mechanism
in their paper (described above) cannot function. On the contrary, in our setting players are
atomless and can only have a single position.13 Our mechanism relies on the endogeneity of the
probability of trade, which enables buyers to manipulate the speed of trade to their advantage. Such
a mechanism does not require large investors; preference heterogeneity and private information are
su¢cient.
Finally, note that in Brunnermeier and Pedersen [6] during episodes of predation prices fall,
but on the other hand, trade speeds up. In other words, distressed sellers are forced to sell at lower
prices, but at least they are able sell and exit quicker than before. This is not the case in our
model: during episodes of predation prices fall, yet distressed sellers nd it more di¢cult to sell due
to buyers reluctance to trade. Anecdotal evidence suggests that our models prediction is more in
line with what happens in decentralized markets (nancial or otherwise) during times of distress
and turbulence. Indeed, during the last crisis the nancial press was rife with news of buyers
holding out despite the falling prices, slowness of trade and investors apparent reluctance to make
a move. Though such behavior may be attributed to uncertainty resolution or risk aversion, there
is no doubt that some of that reluctance was indeed a strategic and deliberate e¤ort to obtain
better deals in the future.
4.3 A Numerical Example
In what follows we provide some sensitivity analysis via numerical simulations. We set the search
intensity  = 125 so that an agent expects to meet 125 other agents a year, which is equivalent
to one counterparty per two business days. Following the calibration in Du¢e et al. [15] the
fraction of investors holding a position (sellers + owners) is assumed to be 0.8. To match this we
set the supply of the asset a = 4:14 Recall that  = a+ 1; so  = 5: The deterministic dividend is
normalized to x = 0; whereas the idiosyncratic dividend v is assumed to be uniformly distributed in
the unit interval. We set  = 0:05, which means that all agents, except distressed sellers, discount
future utility at the annual rate (1 + ) 1  95%: Again, following Du¢e et al. [15], the arrival
rate of the liquidity shock  equals to 0.5 meaning that an owner remains so for an average of 2
13This assumption precludes regular sellers from preying on distressed sellers (as opposed to [6]).
14Recall that the measures of agents holding an asset (sellers and owners) must add up to a and that the measure
of buyers is xed at mb = 1: It follows that the fraction of agents with a position is a=(a+ 1); which equals to 0.8
when a = 4.
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years. The arrival rate of the adverse shock is set  = 6 i.e. on average a seller can last 12= = 2
months without trading before becoming distressed. Finally  = 9; which means that distressed
sellers discount future utility at the annual rate
 
1 + 
 1
= 10%. The table below summarizes
the baseline parameters.
v  U (0; 1) x = 0  = 125 a = 4  = 5
 = 0:5  = 6  = 0:05  = 9
Table 1
Under the benchmark parameter values the model yields equilibrium prices pd = 0:98; p

r = 1:75;
probabilities of trade d = 0:63; 

r = 0:21 and measures of agents m

o = 3:93, m

r = 0:065;
md = 0:005 (recall that m

b = 1). These numbers imply an annual turnover rate of
 (mr

r +m

d

d)
mr +m

d +m

o
= 49:2%;
which is very close to the median annual turnover of 51.7% estimated by Edwards et al. [17].
Similarly about 78:5% of agents are owners, 1.5% are sellers and 20% are buyers. Again, these
estimates are very close to their counterparts in the calibration exercise in Du¢e et al. [15] (see
Table 2 therein).
Before we get into simulations, note the analysis so far was based on a steady state setup.
Therefore, the simulations below depict snapshots of the economy at various steady states; however
they are silent about the transition process between those states. For the dynamic version of the
model, where we explore this transition, see section 5.2.
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Figure 3 depicts prices, probabilities and measures of agents against the arrival rate of the
adverse shock : An increase in  has three consequences. First, more sellers become distressed
and attempt liquidation sales; see the rising  in panel 3c. Second, all sellers, regular and dis-
tressed, trade at lower prices (panel 3a). Third, customers become more reluctant to purchase
from distressed sellers; the probability of trade for those sellers keeps falling (panel 3b). We have
already discussed the mechanism behind this result, but there is a point to add here.
Regular sellers, too, are worse o¤ because of the rising . Facing an increasing prospect of
becoming distressed in the future, they signicantly reduce their prices in an e¤ort to quickly sell
before being hit by the adverse shock (see the falling regular price in 3a). This reaction can be
described as the spillover of distressed sales onto the regular sales and it can be indeed signicant.
To quantify this negative e¤ect we start from a benchmark where  = 2 (the rest of the parameters
are as in Table 1) and then we plot the percentage drop in the regular price against the increasing
. When  = 2 a seller can go on for 12= = 6 months, on average, before becoming distressed
and at that point the equilibrium value for the regular price pr is about 7.42. In Figure 4a we plot
the percentage drop pr () =7:42 1 against  and it is clear that the price drop can be substantial
if  increases signicantly. For instance if  rises from 2 to 6 then the regular price falls by about
75%.
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4.4 Cost of Liquidation Sales
Distressed sellers accept substantially lower prices when they try to liquidate. For instance, under
the benchmark parameters of Table 1 the equilibrium price in a distressed sale pd = 0:98 is about
40% less than the price in a regular sale pr = 1:75. The price cut produces the desired outcome:
conditional on meeting a buyer, a distressed seller has a d = 63% chance of trading as opposed
to r = 21% for a regular seller. Clearly, attempting a liquidation sale is costly. Had the seller
not become distressed, he would have traded at pr but the shock forces him to trade at the lower
price pd: We use the percentage-wise prot loss
 = pd=p

r   1
as a proxy for liquidity. The lower the value of , the more costly the sale, the lower the liquidity.
In panel 4b we plot  against the frequency of the adverse shock  and it is clear that  falls
exponentially in : Indeed when the shock is rather infrequent (  3), i.e. if a seller can go on for
12= = 4 months or more without being distressed, then the prot loss is less than 10%. However
the loss grows rapidly as  grows beyond 3.
The cost of liquidation is also related to the degree of product standardization; specically the
more standardized products a seller holds the less costly the liquidation sale. To establish this
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relationship, start with the coe¢cient of variation
s 
StDev [v]
x
to measure how standard (or homogenous) the products are: the lower the value of s the more
standardized the products (e.g. vanilla interest rate derivatives traded over clearing houses) and
the higher the value of s the opposite (e.g. exotic swaps traded bilaterally). The simulation in
4c plots the prot loss  against s and it is clear that attempting a liquidation sale when holding
standard (vanilla) products is signicantly less costly than doing so when holding non-standard
(exotic) products.15
These insights are in line with the empirical literature on forced asset sales, which provides
several examples and anecdotes where transaction prices deviate from fundamental values due to
forced sales. Pulvino [29] studies commercial aircraft transactions initiated by constrained versus
unconstrained airlines and nds that commercial airplanes sold by distressed airlines bring 10 to
20 percent lower prices when compared to planes sold by regular airlines. Campbell et al. [7]
consider forced selling in the real estate market due to events such as foreclosures and nd large
foreclosure discounts, about 27 percent on average. Coval and Sta¤ord [11] examine institutional
price pressure in equity markets and nd that widespread selling by nancially distressed mutual
funds leads to transaction prices that are signicantly below the fundamental value.
5 Extensions
5.1 Distressed Buyers
In this section we extend the benchmark model by considering the fact that buyers, too, may
become distressed if they are unable to transact. Similar to sellers, buyers may have pressing rea-
sons for acquiring a particular product due to, for instance, speculation, diversication or hedging
purposes including spreading and shifting risk associated with a portfolio position. Consequently,
they may become more eager to purchase if they cannot trade for too long.
Unlike the benchmark there are ve groups of players now: owners (mo), regular sellers (ms;r),
distressed sellers (ms;d), regular buyers (mb;r) and distressed buyers (mb;d). The owchart illustrates
15The random variable v is uniformly distributed over [0; 1] hence StDev [v] is xed and equals to 0.5. We let
x 2 [0; 5] in the simulation hence s ranges from 0.1 to 10, where 0.1 refers to a rather standard market with little
product heterogeneity and 10 refers to a market with a high degree of product heterogeneity.
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how players move across these groups.
Figure 5 - Flowchart
A regular seller becomes distressed at rate s: Given that there are ms;r such sellers in the market,
the outow is equal to sms;r: Similarly, a regular buyer becomes distressed at rate b, hence the
outow is equal to bmb;r: Owners become sellers at rate ; thus the outow is mo: Remaining
ows are given by
Flow1: ms;r [mb;r (vr;r) + mb;d (vd;r)] Flow2: ms;d [mb;r (vr;d) + mb;d (vd;d)]
Flow 3: mb;r [ms;r (vr;r) + ms;d (vr;d)] Flow 4: mb;d [ms;r (vd;r) + ms;d (vd;d)]
Flow 1 represents the number of regular sellers who trade and become buyers. A regular seller
meets a regular buyer at rate mb;r; and the buyer accepts to purchase with probability  (vr;r).
Similarly the seller meets a distressed buyer at rate mb;d; and the buyer accepts to purchase with
probability  (vd;r) : Since there are ms;r regular sellers in the market, the total number of such
sellers who manage to sell and become buyers is given byms;r [mb;r (vr;r) + mb;d (vd;r)] : Flows
2, 3 and 4 can be interpreted similarly. In the steady state the inow into a pool must be equal to
the outow from it; so we have
mo = sms;r + mb;rms;r (vr;r) + mb;dms;r (vd;r) (15)
sms;r = mb;rms;d (vr;d) + mb;dms;d (vd;d) (16)
bmb;r = mb;dms;r (vd;r) + mb;dms;d (vd;d) (17)
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The rst line focuses on the pool of regular sellers. The inow mo consists of owners who are hit
by the liquidity shock. The outow has two components. The rst one is Flow 1, which is discussed
above. The second one is sms;r which is the number of regular sellers who become distressed.
The second line deals with the pool of distressed sellers. The inow consists of regular sellers
who become distressed (sms;r); whereas the outow consists of distressed sellers who trade and
become buyers (Flow 2). Finally the third line deals with the pool of distressed buyers. The inow
consists of regular buyers who become distressed (sms;r); and the outow consists of distressed
buyers who trade and become owners (Flow 4).16 The asset is in xed supply, so we have
mo +ms;r +ms;d = a: (18)
The total measure of agents  is also xed and exceeds a: It follows that the steady state measure
of buyers, too, is xed and equals to
mb;r +mb;d =    a > 0: (19)
Next we turn to the value functions. Unlike the benchmark, there are now two value functions
for buyers: one for distressed buyers, denoted by 
d, and the other for regular buyers, denoted by

r. We have

d = ms;rId;r + ms;dId;d and

r = ms;rIr;r + ms;dIr;d + b (
d   
s)
where
Ii;j =
Z 1
0
max f  (v)  
i   pj; 0g dF (v) , i; j = r; d:
The expression Ii;j is the conditional expected utility of a type i buyer who meets a type j seller.
As long as the net surplus of becoming an owner, given by   (v) pj; exceeds the opportunity cost
of remaining as a buyer, given by 
i, the buyer purchases; otherwise he walks away. Note that,
unlike the benchmark model, the value function of a regular buyer now has a component, given
by b (
d   
s) ; that deals with the possibility of the buyer becoming distressed. For a given pair

i and pj there is an associated threshold (or reservation value) vi;j leaving the buyer indi¤erent
between buying and searching i.e.
  (vi;j) = 
i + pj ,
vi;j + x+ r
 + 
= 
i + pj; where i; j = r; d: (20)
16One can consider the inows and outows from the pools of owners and regular buyers as well; however, it is
easy to verify that those equations are already implied by the system (15), (16) and (17).
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Note that there are four di¤erent thresholds valuations: vr;r; vr;d; vd;r and vd;d (recall that in the
benchmark there were only two, vr and vd): So, the probability that a meeting between a type
i buyer and type j seller results in trade is equal to  (vi;j) : Going through the algebra steps in
Section 3.2 one can show that value functions 
d and 
r can be re-written as follows

d = ms;r
Z 1
vd;r
 (v)
 ( + )
dv + ms;d
Z 1
vd;d
 (v)
 ( + )
dv and

r = ms;r
Z 1
vr;r
 (v)
( + ) ( + b)
dv + ms;d
Z 1
vr;d
 (v)
( + ) ( + b)
dv +
b
 + b

d:
Now turn to sellers. The value functions for distressed and regular sellers are given by
d = [mb;r (vr;d) + mb;d (vd;d)] (pd + 
r   d) and
r = [mb;r (vr;r) + mb;d (vd;r)] (pr + 
r   r) + s (d   r)
Consider the rst line. A distressed seller encounters a regular buyer at rate mb;r and a distressed
buyer at rate mb;d: In the rst scenario the buyer purchases with probability  (vr;d) and in the
second scenario with  (vd;d). If trade occurs the seller obtains price pd plus 
r (he becomes a
regular buyer now) minus d (he is no longer a seller): The second line is the same, except for the
part s (d   r) ; which addresses the possibility of the regular seller becoming distressed in the
future. The rst order condition for a type j = r; d seller is given by
pj + 
r   j =
mb;r (vr;j) +mb;d (vd;j)
( + ) [mb;rf (vr;j) +mb;df (vd;j)]
: (21)
Substituting the FOC into the value functions yields
d =
 [mb;r (vr;d) +mb;d (vd;d)]
2
 ( + ) [mb;rf (vr;d) +mb;df (vd;d)]
and
r =
 [mb;r (vr;r) +mb;d (vd;r)]
2
( + s) ( + ) [mb;rf (vr;r) +mb;df (vd;r)]
+
s
 + s
d:
Observe that 
r; 
d; r and d are all functions of thresholds vr;r; vr;d; vd;r and vdd: One can pin
down vi;j via the indi¤erence equations in (20) and then calculate the prices pr and pd via (21)
and the measures of players mo; ms;r; ms;d; mb;r; mb;d via (15)-(19). However, even though the
methodology is straightforward the algebra does not lend itself for an analytical solution, so we
proceed via numerical simulations. The parameters of interest are s and b; which are the arrival
rates of the adverse shocks that push sellers and buyers into the state of distress. It is sensible
to think that s and b rise and fall together, so we have b = cs for some positive c: Below we
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simulate the equilibrium objects (prices and probabilities of trade) for c = 1 i.e. b = s = 
(simulations with di¤erent values of c produce similar results). Remaining parameters are as in
Table 1.
6a 6b
Figure 6a and 6b depict, respectively, the prices and the probabilities of trade against the arrival
rate of the adverse shock : Distressed sellers are impatient to transact, so they post lower prices
in order to sell quickly (6a). Distressed buyers are also impatient, so they become less selective and
start paying little attention to the idiosyncratic component of the asset, which means that they
are more likely to buy when compared to a regular buyer under the same circumstances. Indeed,
note that  (vd;r) >  (vr;r) and  (vd;d) >  (vr;d) in 6b. It follows that the meeting that is most
likely to result in trade is the one where a distressed seller meets a distressed buyer as both parties
are most eager to trade. Similarly, the meeting that is least likely to result in trade is the opposite
case where a regular seller meets a regular buyer as neither party is in a hurry. The other two
scenarios, where a regular seller meets a distressed buyer and a distressed seller meets a regular
buyer, lie between these two extremes.17
The simulation in 6a further reveals that prices are hump-shaped in . To understand why
note that from a sellers perspective a rise in  has two contrasting e¤ects. On the positive side
it increases the number of distressed buyers, who are ready to pay more, which induces sellers
17Note that when   0 a distressed seller is highly likely to make a sale: if he meets a distressed buyer the
probability of trade is almost 1, and if he meets a regular buyer the probability of trade is close to 40%, which
is signicantly higher than a regular sellers chance of making a sale under the same circumstances (less 10%).
The reason is that when  is so small there are very few distressed players in the market. A buyer who meets
a distressed seller knows that he is very unlikely to encounter another seller with such a low price, so the buyer
becomes signicantly less selective about how good a t the asset is.
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to raise their prices. On the negative side the rising  causes more sellers to become distressed,
which in turn induces them to lower their prices. The simulations suggest that the positive e¤ect
is dominant if  is small and the negative e¤ect is dominant if  is large: if   0 (if shocks are
highly unlikely) then sellers increase their prices in order to take advantage of the few distressed
buyers present in the market; however as  grows large the second e¤ect starts to kick in, bringing
down the prices.
Notice that even though prices may eventually fall; the drop is not as sharp as it was in the
benchmark model. For instance, if  rises from 2 to 6 then in the benchmark model prices fall by
about 75% (see 3a), whereas in here they fall by about 15% (both simulations are based on the
parameter values in Table 1, so they are comparable). The reason is that in the benchmark model
 did not a¤ect buyers whereas in here it does, which, from a sellers perspective, is a welcome
outcome. Indeed the rising  pushes more buyers into a state of distress, making them willing
to transact at higher prices. This e¤ect prevents prices from falling as sharply as they did in the
benchmark.
A nal observation is this. The trajectories of the probabilities in 6b have generally the opposite
pattern of the trajectories of prices in 6a: if prices rise then the probabilities fall and if prices fall
then the probabilities rise. The exception is distressed sellers: even though they decrease their
prices, their probabilities of trade  (vr;d) and  (vd;d) still keep falling. This is the predation
result discussed in the benchmark, and the simulation suggests that it is present in this version
of the model as well. Notice, however, the extent of predation is signicantly less pronounced in
here than it was in the benchmark. Indeed, a comparison between Figure 3 and Figure 6 reveals
that the percentage-wise drops in prices as well as in probabilities are larger in the benchmark
than they are in here.18 This is not surprising, because, as mentioned above, in addition to its
impact on sellers,  now has an adverse impact on buyers as well, so if  rises then everyone in the
market, not just sellers, face a higher likelihood of becoming distressed. This consideration lters
into sellers and buyers value functions and thereby prevents prices and the probabilities of trade
from decreasing as sharply as they did before.
From a risk management point of view, these observations suggest that in periods of high
volatility (e.g. when  rises) rms must not rush into lowering prices. Instead they ought to assess
whether and to what extent potential customers may become distressed and they should make
their pricing decisions accordingly.
18Note that in 6b the initial drops in  (vr;d) and  (vd;d) are due to the rising prices. Predation can be identied
only after prices start to fall.
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5.2 Dynamics
We now construct a dynamic version of the benchmark model. This extension will allow us to
explore the transition process through which the economy responds to an exogenous shock and
how it approaches to the new steady state. Specically we are interested in the shocks immediate
e¤ect on equilibrium objects and the time-pattern of the recovery. To start, note that the measures
of agents evolve according to
_md =  mdd + mr
_mr =  mrr   mr + mo
_mo = mrr + mdd   mo:
These expressions are similar to their counterparts in the benchmark except now we have the time
di¤erentials _md; _mr and _mo: Buyers value function is given by

 = mr
Z 1
vr
 (v) dv
 + 
+ md
Z 1
vd
 (v) dv
 + 
+ _
;
where at each point in time thresholds vd (t) and vr (t) satisfy the indi¤erence condition
pj + 
 =
vj + x+ r
 + 
for j = r; d:
Sellers value functions are given by
d =  (vd) (pd + 
  d) + _d and
r =  (vr) (pr + 
  r) +  (d   r) + _r:
A type j seller solves
max
pj2R+
j s.t. pj + 
 =
vj + x+ r
 + 
:
Recall that 
0 = 0 i.e. an individual seller fails to realize how his pricing decision a¤ects buyers
value function 
: Here we further assume that _0r =
_0d = 0 i.e. sellers fails to internalize the
e¤ects of their pricing decisions on time di¤erentials _r and _d:With this simplication, the FOC
of a type j seller is given by
pj + 
  j =
(vj)
( + ) f (vj)
;
and therefore
d = 
ss
d +
_d

and r = 
ss
r +
 _d
( + ) 
+
_r
 + 
;
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where ssd and 
ss
r are the steady state value functions in the benchmark, which were given by
(11) and (12). Combining the indi¤erence conditions with the FOCs yields
0 =
 (vr)
f (vr)
+ r   vr   x and (22)
0 =
 (vd)
f (vd)
+ ( + ) d   r   vd   x: (23)
These expressions are identical to their counterparts in the benchmark (compare with 13 and 14),
except of course d and r have dynamic components _d and _r: In what follows we express these
components in terms of _vd and _vr: To do so, rst substitute the FOC into the indi¤erence condition
to obtain
j +
(vj)
( + ) f (vj)
=
vj + x+ r
 + 
:
Totally di¤erentiating this equation wrt to time yields (recall that _0r =
_0d = 0)
( + )

@j
@vr
_vr +
@j
@vd
_vd + _j

 

1 +
f 0 (vj)  (vj)
f 2 (vj)

_vj = _vj + 

@r
@vr
_vr +
@r
@vd
_vd + _r

;
where @j=@vr and @j=@vd are given by (25) and (26) in the appendix. These relationships pin
down _r and _d, and therefore r and d, as functions of _vr and _vd: Substituting the resulting
expressions into (22) and (23) yields the system of ODE that pin down the equilibrium values of
vr and vd at any given time t. Specically,"
1;1 1;2
2;1 2;2
# 
_vr
_vd

=
"
 (vr) =f (vr) + 
ss
r   vr   x
 (vd) =f (vd) + ( + ) 
ss
d   
ss
r   vd   x
#
;
where
1;1 =
n
1
+
+ 
(+)(+)
on
2 + f
0(vr)(vr)
f2(vr)
o
  
+
@r
@vr
1;2 =

(+)(+)
n
2 + f
0(vd)(vd)
f2(vd)
  ( + ) @d
@vd
  (+)

@r
@vd
o
2;1 =
(++)
(+)(+)
  
(+)
n
2 + f
0(vr)(vr)
f2(vr)
o
+ 
+
@r
@vr
2;2 =
(++)
(+)
n
2
(+)
+ f
0(vd)(vd)
(+)f2(vd)
  @d
@vd
o
+ 
+
@r
@vd
:
Observe that substituting _vr = _vd = 0 yields the steady state equilibrium conditions in the
benchmark. However, analytically characterizing the solution of this system is a non-trivial task.
To proceed we simulate the system using the parameters in Table 1 and the initial conditions vr (0)
and vd (0) : We assume that at time t = 0 the economy is at steady state; hence vr (0) and vd (0)
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correspond to the equilibrium values of vr and v

d in the benchmark. Given vr (0) and vd (0) one
can, then, pin down the starting values of measures of agents and the steady state value functions
ssd and 
ss
r :
In what follows we simulate how the economy responds to a sudden and permanent rise in :
We set the initial value of  to 1 indicating that regular seller, on average, lasts 12/ = 12 months
without becoming distressed. At date t = 0 the value of  suddenly jumps to 6. Figures 7a and 7b
depict trajectories of prices as well as the measure of distressed sellers in response to this shock.
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The sudden rise in the arrival rate of the adverse shock triggers an immediate and sharp drop in
prices, which is then followed by an extended reversal phase. Note that prices initially over-react
to the shock and fall below their new steady state level, only to recover afterwards. The recovery
phase occurs within the rst month whereas the convergence to the new steady state appears
to take about six months. Du¢e [13], in his presidential address to the AFA, explores various
mechanisms causing similar overreactions in price dynamics. These include the relatively small
subset of risk-bearing capacity that is immediately available to absorb a shock on short notice,
institutional impediments to capital movement and investors occasional lack of attention to trade.
In our case the underlying reason behind the overreaction is the temporary glut of distressed
sellers in the market. Indeed, the simulation in panel 7b reveals that within a few weeks after
the sudden rise in  there are four times as many distressed sellers in the market as they were
before. Consequently, prices overreact to this glut and fall below their steady state level. As the
glut resolves prices recover and converge to the new steady state.
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Notice that the pattern of the prices in response to the shock and the prolonged amount
of recovery time lends support to the search model in the context of OTC markets. There is
signicant empirical evidence that supply and demand shocks in asset markets, in addition to
triggering an instant price reaction, lead to corrections that take a relatively prolonged amount
of time. For instance, after major downgrades or defaults in OTC corporate bond markets one
typically observes large price drops which are followed by delayed recovery phases e.g. see [19] and
[10]. A similar scenario is reported in [25], who found that after large capital redemptions in 2005,
convertible bond prices dropped immediately and rebounded only after several months.
In these examples the time pattern of the prices after the external shock reveals that the
friction at work is not a transaction cost for trade. Indeed, if this were the case then investors
would instantaneously modify their portfolios and the new price would be established very soon
after the shock and it would remain there until the arrival of the next shock. In these examples,
however, the price initially over-reacts to the shock and the correction takes a prolonged amount of
time. The speed of adjustment, at least in part, is a reection of search frictions in the marketi.e.
the fact that it takes considerable time and e¤ort (especially during times of volatility e.g. after
an external shock) to nd new investors and to negotiate the new terms with them.
What is remarkable, our simulations show that, just as observed empirically, prices initially
overreact to the shock and it takes a signicant amount of time until they recover and approach
to their new steady state levels. This is indeed in line with the empirical papers referenced above,
and therefore it gives further credit to the search-and-matching model to be used in the context
of OTC markets.
5.3 Risk Management
The arrival rate of the adverse shock is exogenous. As a result there is not much a regular seller
can do for not being hit by the shock except for trying to sell as quick as possible. The exogeneity
of the adverse shock, admittedly, hinders our models ability to talk about strategies on how to
prevent the shock or perhaps how to delay it; but, nevertheless, our results still o¤er some valuable
insights into risk management.
First, the under shooting of the price is indeed signicant. The simulation in panel 7a suggests
that both the regular price and the distressed price initially fall about 25% below the new steady
state level and the recovery phase takes about a month. These observations indicate that risk
management should take into account the time frame in which assets are marked-to-market, espe-
cially if the position is secured via collateralized nancing. Risk management should be mindful of
the fact that during times of nancial distress (e.g. when  suddenly goes up) it takes signicantly
longer to sell (because of predation) and that the market price undershoots signicantly before it
recovers. These details ought to be built into the contract when obtaining the loan to secure the
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position. Otherwise the loan provider, e.g. the broker, might mark-to-market too aggressively in
an e¤ort to trigger a margin call and liquidate the collateral.19
Furthermore, in the light of the spill-over result discussed earlier, one should take into account
the inter-dependant nature of nancial markets and the indirect e¤ects and repercussions of a
potential shock hitting trading partners or related investors. Said di¤erently, a prudent risk man-
agement strategy should depend on nancial standing of related traders and should have scenarios
drawn against the possibility that they may fall into distress. An example for such a measure is
JP Morgans dealer exit stress test, which assesses the risk that a rival is forced to withdraw from
the market.20
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to a recent literature spurred by Du¢e et al. [14] studying the OTC
markets via search and matching and complements this literature by assuming that (i) buyers
preferences are heterogenous and their willingness to pay is private information and that (ii)
sellers are heterogeneous in terms of their urgency to sell. A search equilibrium exists and it
is unique. In equilibrium distressed sellers pursue liquidation salesthat is, they signicantly
undercut their competitors in an e¤ort to quickly trade and exit from their positions. Liquidation
sales are associated with considerable prot losses, but more importantly they open the door
for predation. Indeed we demonstrate that during periods where an increasing number of sellers
become distressed, buyers deliberately hold o¤ purchasing from such sellers, which in turn exerts
more pressure on them and forces them for further price cutsan outcome which we call predatory
buying.
19Brunnermeier and Pedersen [6] provide an anecdote for such an outcome involving Granite Partners (Askin
Capital Management), who held very illiquid xed income securities: "[Granites] main brokersMerrill Lynch,
DLJ, and othersgave the fund less than 24 hours to meet a margin call. Merrill Lynch and DLJ then allegedly
sold o¤ collateral assets at below market prices at an insider-only auction in which bids were solicited from a
restricted number of other brokers excluding retail institutional investors."
20David Remstein, JP Morgans Global Head of Investment Performance, in his Investment Analytics & Con-
sulting newsletter (Second Quarter 2012) states that "Another popular approach to building an extreme event is to
consider the interrelationship of nancial markets and the e¤ect a liquidity shock may have on it. [...] An example
of this technique might be an event causing a sharp increase in market risk and dealers exiting positions to avoid
breaching trading limits. This contributes to further volatility and triggers action to be taken by other market
participants [...]. The behaviour spreads to other markets through the deterioration in liquidity and the inability
to implement hedging strategies, thus causing further increases in volatility."
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof involves three steps.
Step 0. Preliminaries. We have
d =
2(vd)
(+)f(vd)
and r =

(+)(+)
h
2(vr)
f(vr)
+ 
2(vd)
f(vd)
i
: (24)
The following partial derivatives will be useful
@d
@vd
=  (vd)
(+)
 2f
2(vd)+f
0(vd)(vd)
f2(vd)
and @r
@vd
= 
+
 @d
@vd
; (25)
@r
@vr
=   (vr)
(+)(+)
 2f
2(vr)+f 0(vr)(vr)
f2(vr)
and @d
@vr
= 0: (26)
All partial derivatives (except for @d
@vr
) are negative because Assumption 1 (log concavity).
Step 1. Existence-. We will show that the locus of r = 0 and that of d = 0 intersect once
in vr   vd space, where r and d are given by (13) and (14). To start, let
r (vr)
:
= fvd 2 [0; 1] j r (vr; vd) = 0g
be the locus of r (vr; vd) : Similarly let d (vr) be the locus of d: We will establish that r is
downward sloping whereas d is upward sloping wrt vr: Di¤erentiating (13) and (14) wrt vr and
vd we have:
@r
@vr
=  f
2(vr)+f 0(vr)(vr)
f2(vr)
+  @r
@vr
  1 < 0 @r
@vd
=  @r
@vd
< 0
@d
@vd
=  f
2(vd)+f
0(vd)(vd)
f2(vd)
+ ( + ) @d
@vd
   @r
@vd
  1 < 0 @d
@vr
=   @r
@vr
> 0
(27)
Focus on @r
@vr
: The rst term and @r
@vr
are both negative because of log concavity; hence @r
@vr
< 0:
Similarly @r
@vd
< 0 since @r
@vd
is negative. Therefore r (vr; vd) = 0 denes vd = r (vr) as an implicit
function of vr (Implicit Function Theorem) with
dr
dvr
=  
@r=@vr
@r=@vd
< 0;
i.e. the locus of r = 0 is downward sloping wrt vr: Similarly one can verify that
@d
@vd
< 0 and
@d
@vr
> 0; therefore
dd
dvr
=  
@d=@vr
@d=@vd
> 0;
which means that the locus of d = 0 is upward sloping.
Now we prove that r (0) > d (0) and r (1) < d (1) : Start by substituting (vr; vd) = (0; 0) into
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r and d and observe that r (0; 0) > d (0; 0) because  > : In addition note that
@d
@vd
< @r
@vd
<
0 (this follows from log-concavity and that @d
@vd
< @r
@vd
). It follows that r (0; vd) > d (0; vd) for
all vd > 0: This, in turn, implies that r (0) > d (0). Similarly (vr; vd) = (0; 0) into r and d and
observe that r (0; 0) = d (0; 0) =   (1 + x) : Since
@d
@vd
< @r
@vd
< 0 we have r (1; vd) < d (1; vd)
for all vd < 1: This inequality implies that r (1) < d (1).
Since (i) dr
dvr
< 0 and dd
dvr
> 0; (ii) r (0) > d (0) and (iii) r (1) < d (1) ;the Intermediate
Value Theorem guarantees existence of a unique vr 2 (0; 1) such that r (v

r) = d (v

r) = v

d.
Step 2. Liquidation Sales-. First we will show that vd < v

r ; which, in turn, implies that
 (vd) >  (v

r) : Recall that
@r
@vr
< 0 and @d
@vr
> 0; hence the di¤erence r  d decreases in vr:
Now, by contradiction suppose that vr = v

d = v and notice that
r (v; v) d (v; v) = r (v; v)  d (v; v) =
2(v)( )
f(v)(+)
> 0:
The expression is positive because  > : The fact that r (v; v) > d (v; v) implies that v

r 6= v

d
because in equilibrium we must have r (v

r ; v

d) = d (v

r ; v

d) : The inequality gets worse if v

d > v

r
because r  d decreases in vr: The equilibrium condition can be satised only if v

d < v

r :
The inequality pr > p

d is follows from the indi¤erence conditions (7) implying
pr   p

d = (v

r   v

d) = ( + ) > 0;
which is positive because vd < v

r : 
Proof of Remark 4. The rst part of the remark deals with the signs of  (vr) and  (v

d)
wrt x: Recall that
sign
 
dvj=du

= sign (detBj (u)) for j = r; d
where det (Br (u)) and det (Bd (u)) are given by (35). Below we show that detBr (x) and detBd (x)
are both negative. Note that
@d
@x
= @r
@x
=   1
+
:
It follows that
detBr (x) =
1
+
h
@d
@vd
  @r
@vd
i
< 0
detBd (x) =
1
+
h
@r
@vr
  @d
@vr
i
< 0
In the rst line, the expression in square brackets is negative because @d
@vd
< @r
@vd
< 0; see the proof
of Proposition 3. The expression in the second line is negative because @r
@vr
< 0 and @d
@vr
> 0: The
signs of the determinants imply that both vr and v

d fall and therefore  (v

r) and  (v

d) rise in x:
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Characterization of Corner Solutions. Let v+r be the specic value of vr satisfying
2(v+r )
(+)f(v+r )
+
(v+r )
f(v+r )
  v+r  
1
f(0)
h
1 + 
(+)
i
= 0: (28)
Basic algebra reveals that if x = x+, where
x+
:
=
(1+=)
(+)f(0)
  
+

v+r  
(v+r )
f(v+r )

; (29)
then r (v
+
r ; 0) = d (v
+
r ; 0) = 0; hence the the pair v
 = (v+r ; 0) correspond to an equilibrium.
Recall that vr and v

d both fall in x: So, if x > x
+ then vd falls below 0; implying that the
probability of trade  (vd) exceeds 1, which, of course, is impossible. In this parameter region,
distressed sellers FOC no longer holds with equality. The concavity of sellers objective function
implies that distressed sellers pick the price pd satisfying vd = 0 (not the FOC) and the indi¤erence
condition (7). More specically, pd satises
x+r
+
= pd + 
; (30)
where the equation is obtained by substituting vd = 0 into (7). Substitute (30) and vd = 0 into
distressed sellers value function d to obtain
d =
(x+r)
(+)(+)
:
Relaxed sellers problem is still the same. We conjecture that (to be veried below) their FOC
pr + 
  r =
(vr)
(+)f(vr)
(31)
holds with equality. Substitute (31) along with d from above and vd = 0 into r to obtain
r = c3
2(vr)(+)
f(vr)
+ c3x (32)
where
c3 =

( + )
 
 + 

( + )  
 1
2 (0; 1) :
Relaxed sellers face the indi¤erence condition
vr+x+r
+
= pr + 
: (33)
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Combine the indi¤erence condition with their FOC (31) above to obtain
r (vr) =
(vr)
f(vr)
+ r   vr   x = 0:
This function looks similar to the equilibrium condition in (13), but unlike the former, this one
does not depend on vd anymore (now r is a function of vr only). Substitute r from (32) into
r to obtain
r (vr) =
(vr)
f(vr)
+ c3
2(vr)(+)
f(vr)
  vr   c3x ( + )


 
 + 

+ 

= 0:
It is easy to verify that r falls in vr (assuming log-concavity). In addition r (1) < 0: So if
r (0) > 0 then there exits an interior v

r 2 (0; 1) satisfying r (vr) = 0: Note that
r (0) > 0, x < x
++;
where
x++
:
=
(+)f(+)(+)+g 
f(0)(+)f(+)+g
: (34)
Therefore if x < x++ relaxed sellers FOC holds with equality and the optimal vr is interior; hence
 (vr) < 1: If, however, x  x
++ then, relaxed sellers, too, set pr satisfying vr = 0 and their
indi¤erence condition (33). In this parameter region both  (vd) and  (v

r) are equal to 1. The
value functions and other equilibrium objects can be obtained using the steps above. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Recall that vr and v

d simultaneously satisfy
r (v

r ; v

d) = 0 and d (v

r ; v

d) = 0:
Omit the superscript  when understood and note that (General Implicit Function Theorem)
dvj
du
=
detBj(u)
detA
; for u = ; x; ;  and j = r; d;
where
Br (u) =
"
 @r
@u
@r
@vd
 @d
@u
@d
@vd
#
; Bd (u) =
"
@r
@vr
 @r
@u
@d
@vr
 @d
@u
#
; A =
"
@r
@vr
@r
@vd
@d
@vr
@d
@vd
#
:
Note that
detA = @r
@vr
( )
@d
@vd
( )
  @d
@vr
(+)
@r
@vd
( )
> 0:
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The signs of the partial derivatives follow from (27). It follows that
sign (dvj=du) = sign (detBj (u)) ;
where
detBr (u) =
@r
@vd
@d
@u
  @d
@vd
@r
@u
and detBd (u) =
@d
@vr
@r
@u
  @r
@vr
@d
@u
: (35)
The setup is general and it can be used to analyze the signs of the partial derivatives of vr and
vd wrt any one of the parameters ; x; ; ; but this proposition is about the sign of v

d wrt ; so
below we focus on detBd (). To start, note that
@d
@
=   @r
@
and @r
@
=  @r
@
;
where
@r
@
=   
(+)(+)2

2(vr )
f(vr )
  

2(vd)
f(vd)

(+)
:
Note that @r
@
is negative, because the expression in the square brackets (call it T1) is positive.
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Now, substitute @d
@vr
and @d
@vd
, which are given in (27), into detBd () to obtain
detBd () =  

+
 @r
@
( )
 2f
2(vr)+f 0(vr)(vr)
f2(vr)
(+)
> 0:
The last expression is positive because of log concavity. We have already established that @r=@
is negative; hence detBd () is positive, which implies that dv

d=d is positive, which in turn implies
that the equilibrium probability of sale  (vd) falls in :
Now we will show that pd; too, falls in : Use the FOC (10) and the expression for d; given
by (24), to obtain
pd + 
 =
(vd)
(+)f(vd)
h
1 + 

 (vd)
i
:
Call the expression on the right hand side T2 and notice that
dp
d
d
= @T2
v
d
( )
dv
d
d
(+)
  d

d
(+)
:
21To see why combine the FOCs, given by (10), with the value functions d and r, given by (24), to obtain
pr   p

d =
(v
r
)
f(v
r
)(+)  
(v
d
)
f(vd)(+)
+ (+)(+)  T1 > 0:
This expression is positive since we have established that in equilibrium pr > p

d: Now focus on the rst two terms
on the right hand side. The expression  (v) =f (v) falls in v because of log concavity. Since vr > v

d in equilibrium,
it follows that the summation of the rst two terms is negative. This means that, for pr > p

d to hold T1 must be
positive. Hence @r=@ is negative.
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It is easy to verify that @T2
v
d
is negative because of log-concavity;
dv
d
d
is positive from above. In
addition d

d
> 0. Hence
dp
d
d
is negative. 
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